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Abstract – The dining cryptographers protocol implements a multiple access channel in which sen-
ders and recipients are anonymous. A problem is that a malicious participant can disrupt communi-
cation by deliberately creating collisions. We propose a computationally secure dining cryptographers
protocol with collision resolution that achieves a maximum stable throughput of 0.924 messages per
round and which allows to easily detect disruptors.
1 Introduction
Protocols for untraceable communication have received much attention recently as
they can help us protect our privacy and avoid cyber espionage. The aim of these
protocols is not to encrypt messages but to prevent an attacker from determining who
is communicating with whom.
The dining cryptographers protocol [3] is the most secure protocol for untraceable
communication known in computer science. This multi-party protocol implements a
multiple access channel in which senders and recipients of messages remain anonymous.
Unlike other primitives like mixes [4] and onion routing [9, 7], it does not require a
trusted third party and it is not vulnerable to network based attacks like traffic shaping.
The problem is that messages collide when multiple senders attempt to transmit a
message at the same time. Even worse, malicious participants can disrupt the commu-
nication by deliberately creating collisions all the time. Such disruptors are hard to
identify because the anonymity of the honest senders must be preserved.
Recent computationally secure variants of the dining cryptographers protocol use
an anonymous reservation phase in order to avoid collisions and a technique based on
zero-knowledge proofs to detect disruptors [8, 6, 5]. However, the implementation of
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such an anonymous reservation phase is complicated and reservations do not adapt
well to the situations where participants frequently join or leave the group.
The present paper shows that one can address collisions as they occur using a colli-
sion resolution algorithm and still prevent disruption by a malicious participant. First,
we show that with a modified SICTA collision resolution algorithm, a maximum stable
throughput (MST) of 0.924 packets per round can be achieved for the dining crypto-
graphers protocol. Then, we show that it is possible to use zero-knowledge proofs to
verify that each participant properly executes the collision resolution algorithm.
Compared to the existing techniques our approach is easier to implement as there is
no reservation phase. Further, it adapts better to situation where participants join and
leave. We see possible applications in the fields of electronic voting and low latency
anonymous communication.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains preliminaries and
definitions. In section 3, we discuss collision resolution with SICTA. In section 4 we
show how disruptors can be detected. In section 5 we discuss related work, in section
6 we present possible applications, and we conclude in section 7.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly review the principle behind the dining cryptographers
protocol and a technique to implement it efficiently.
Dining Cryptographers
In one round of the dining cryptographers protocol [3], every participant broadcasts
a ciphertext (O), which may or may not contain a message (M). (To keep the de-
scription simple, we assume that the participants have reliable broadcast channels at
their disposal.) The encryption vanishes when the ciphertexts of all participants are
combined (e.g., C := ∏i O(i)). If exactly one ciphertext contains a message, then thismessage appears (e.g., C = M). However, there is a collision when several ciphertexts
contain a message (e.g., C = M ·M ′ ·M ′′). We assume that messages are encoded with
a checksum, so that it is possible to distinguish between a message and a collision of
messages.
Generation of Ciphertexts
We generate ciphertexts as described by Golle and Juels in [10]. The advantage
of this technique, which is based on the Diffie-Hellman key agreement, is that after
a single setup phase the participants can generate ciphertexts for a large number of
rounds. To this effect, participants share finite groups H = ⟨h⟩ and G = ⟨g⟩ and a
bilinear map e : H × H → G such that e(ha, hb) = e(h, h)ab = gab for a, b ∈ Z. The
Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman (BDDH) problem is assumed to be hard in H and
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G. Each participant has a private key x and the corresponding public keys y¯ = hx and
y = gx are known to all participants.
In a round j of the protocol, each participant then generates a ciphertext Oj ∈ G
which has an algebraic structure. This means that Oj is either of the form:
Oj = Aj
x (1)
or of the form:
Oj = Aj
xM , (2)
wherein x ∈ Z is a secret key and M ∈ G is a message. As we have the BDDH
assumption, one cannot distinguish whether Oj contains a message M or not.
The value Aj is public and it is based on the public keys y¯ = hx of the other
participants and on a public random value Rj which is different in every round. For
example, n participants P (1), ..., P (n) compute:
A
(i)
j = e
(
i−1∏
k=1
y¯(k)
n∏
k=i+1
1/y¯(k), Rj
)
. (3)
The so obtained values A(i)j are different in each round and have the property that theycancel when they are multiplied. I.e.,
n∏
k=1
(
A
(k)
j
)x(k)
= 1. (4)
Therefore, only messages remain when a recipient multiplies the ciphertexts O(1)j ...O(n)jprovided by all the participants.
3 Collision Resolution with SICTA
In this section we explain the SICTA algorithm (Successive Inference Cancellation
Tree Algorithm) [14] and show that in the context of the dining cryptographers protocol
we can reach the throughput to 0.924 messages per round.
Collision Resolution
Let us assume in a round j each participant provides a ciphertext Oj . If seve-
ral of these ciphertexts contain a message, the combination of all these ciphertexts
Cj :=
∏n
i=1 O
(i)
j only provides a multiplication of all the messages and no meaningfulinformation is transmitted. The purpose of a collision resolution algorithm is to resolve
such a collision by resending the involved messages in later rounds.
SICTA is a binary tree algorithm, in which a collision of messages is repeatedly
split until all messages have been transmitted. When there is a collision in one round,
two subsequent rounds are dedicated to the resolution of this collision. Each message
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Rysunek 1. Exemplary binary collision resolution tree with succes-
sive inference cancellation (SICTA). In rounds 1,2,4,6 and 14, the
ciphertexts Oj are transmitted, and Cj is computed using these ci-
phertexts. In rounds 3,5,7 and 15, no data is transmitted and Cj is
computed using the data from the parent node and the sibling node.
involved in the collision is then retransmitted at random in one of two dedicated rounds.
This process is repeated recursively until all collisions are resolved. An example of a
SICTA collision resolution tree is shown in Figure 1. To simplify the description we
adapt our notation to binary trees; when a collision occurs in round j, we assume that
the rounds 2j and 2j + 1 are dedicated for the resolution. SICTA uses a technique
called inference cancellation to reduce the number of transmissions. As we have Cj =
C2j ·C2j+1, it is not necessary to transfer any O2j+1 for round 2j+1. The value C2j+1
can be inferred from Cj and C2j by computing C2j+1 = Cj/C2j . For this inference
cancellation to work, the algorithm operates in the blocked access mode which means
that no new message can be sent until all collisions are resolved.
Performance
Let us consider the maximum stable throughput (MST), which denotes the maximal
input rate (messages/round) for which all messages have a finite delay. Therefore we
define Sk as the average number of rounds needed to resolve a collision of k messages,
and we consider the throughput k/Sk.
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A collision of k messages is split into two collisions with i and k − i messages with a
probability (k
i
)
2−k. Thus we have:
Sk =
k∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
2−k(Si + Sk−i). (5)
With (k
i
)
=
(
k
k−i
) this can be written as:
Sk =
k∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
21−kSi (6)
and after removing the recursion we obtain:
Sk =
21−k
1− 21−k
k−1∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
Si. (7)
As ’collisions’ with 0 or 1 messages take only 1 round, we have S0 = S1 = 1. The
throughput k/Sk for the increasing values of k is shown in Figure 2. For SICTA the
known MST of 0.693 is observed.
We can achieve a higher throughput by exploiting the fact that in the dining crypto-
graphers protocol all senders are also receivers. After a collision of two messages, the
two respective senders can recover each other’s message by removing their own from
the collision. Then they can avoid a further collision by using a rule that for instance
only the numerically smaller message is resent. This way, collisions of two messages
are always resolved in two rounds, i.e., we have S2 = 2, which leads to a MST of 0.924.
So we have just computed the possible throughput of the channel and seen that
efficient collision resolution is possible. We have done this on the assumption that
every participant is honest and that no disruption takes place. This assumption is
reasonable, as we show in the next section that disruptors can easily be detected and
eliminated from the group. Being exceptional events, disruptions have no impact on
the asymptotic (number of rounds→∞) behaviour of the channel.
4 Detecting Disruptors
In this section, we show that disruptors are easy to detect. We first present techniques
using zero-knowledge proofs to prove statements about the retransmission of messages,
and then we show how these techniques can be used to verify that each participant
correctly performs the SICTA algorithm.
Zero-Knowledge Proofs for the Retransmission of Messages
It was shown in [10] that the algebraic structure of the ciphertexts makes it possible
to prove statements about them using zero-knowledge proofs. Such a zero-knowledge
proof allows a prover to prove to a verifier that a given statement holds, without giving
the verifier any further information. That is, the verifier cannot compute anything
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Rysunek 2. Performance of collision resolution with SICTA.
that he could not have computed before. For instance one can prove the equality of
discrete logarithms to different bases, and logical ∧ (and) and ∨ (or) combinations of
such statements [1]. It is also possible to prove the inequality of logarithm to different
bases [2].
Existing zero-knowledge proofs used in the dining cryptographers protocols contain
statements about individual ciphertexts. For example, the statement
logA1(O1) = logg y (8)
holds when the ciphertext O1 is empty (i.e., O1 = Ax1). As a reminder, x is a secretkey of the participant and y = gx the corresponding public key.
To verify the correct execution of the SICTA collision resolution protocols we use
a new kind of statements, which hold when there is a relation between two or more
ciphertexts coming from the same participant. E.g., the statement
logA1/A2(O1/O2) = logg y (9)
holds when both ciphertexts O1 and O2 encode the same message M (or when both
encode no message). It is thus possible to construct more complex statements in order
to verify the retransmission of a message.
Example 1. The ciphertext O2 either contains no message, or the same message
as O1, when the statement
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Rysunek 3. Collision resolution in SICTA. Only a message involved
in a collision in round j may be retransmitted also in round 2j. The
round 2j + 1 is virtual; no transmission takes place. No new message
can be sent until all collisions are resolved.
(logA2/A1(O2/O1) = logg y) ∨ (logA2(O2) = logg y) (10)
holds.
Example 2. At most one ciphertext out of O2, ..., Ok contains the same message
as O1 (and the rest of O2, ..., Ok contain no message), when the statement
(logA2...Aj/A1(O2...Oj/O1) = logg y) ∨ (logAj (Oj) = logg y) (11)
holds for j ∈ {2, ..., k}. (Note that it is not sufficient to consider only the last statement,
as a participant could encode O2 = Ax2E and O3 = Ax3E−1 instead of O2 = Ax2 and
O3 = A
x
3 . In the multiplication O2O3..., the factors E and E−1 would cancel, andthe statement would hold. It is therefore necessary to consider each statement for
j ∈ {2, ..., k}.)
Verification of Standard SICTA with a MST of 0.693
We now show how the techniques from the previous section can be used by the
participants to prove that they executed the collision resolution algorithm correctly,
without revealing if they are sending a message or not (so that the senders of the
messages remain anonymous).
Correct participation in the standard SICTA algorithm means that a participant
may only retransmit a message in round 2j if he already transmitted that message in
round j. Remember that SICTA operates in the blocking mode no new message can be
sent until the resolution has finished. This principle, which is illustrated in Figure 3,
means that
• if a participant transmits Oj = Axj in round j, then he must transmit O2j =
Ax2j in round 2j; and
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• if a participant transmits Oj = AxjM in round j, then he must transmit either
O2j = A
x
2j or O2j = Ax2jM in round 2j.(Note that sending no message equals to sendingM = 1. If the participant did
not send a message in round j, this means that Oj = Axj · 1. The participantthen has the ’choice’ between retransmitting O2j = Ax2j or O2j = Ax2j · 1 inround 2j. That is, he is forced to retransmit O2j = Ax2j · 1 = Ax2j and maynot send a message.)
Using the techniques from the previous section, each participant can prove that his
ciphertext O2j is correct, without revealing if whether it contains a message or not. To
do this, the participant generates a zero-knowledge proof that proves that(logAj/A2j (Oj/O2j) = logg y) ∨ (logA2j (O2j) = logg y) (12)
holds. With this proof he can convince a verifier that he participated correctly, without
compromising the anonymity of the protocol.
As described before, SICTA is a recursive algorithm and there are virtual rounds
during which Cj is inferred, but no corresponding Oj is transmitted. It is then not
possible to prove statement (12), but luckily it is still possible to prove that O2j is
correct. To do this, the participant proves that a message contained in the nearest
transmitted parent round was transmitted at most once in all the branches down to
O2j . Akin to Example 2, a participant proves that(logAjt/2/Aj1 ...Ajt (Ojt/2/Oj1 ...Ojt)= logg y
)
∨
(logA2j (O2j)= logg y) (13)
holds, wherein j1 := 2j, jk := (jk−1/2) − 1 and t such that jt/2 is the index of the
nearest transmitted parent round of round j.
Example 3. In the collision resolution process shown in Figure 1, each participant
shows for O2 that(logA1/A2(O1/O2) = logg y) ∨ (logA2(O2) = logg y) (14)
holds, then for O4 that(logA2/A4(O2/O4) = logg y) ∨ (logA4(O4) = logg y) (15)
holds, then for O6 that(logA1/A2A6(O1/O2O6) = logg y) ∨ (logA6(O6) = logg y) (16)
holds, then for O14 that(logA1/A2A6A14(O1/O2O6O14) = logg y) ∨ (logA14(O14) = logg y) (17)
holds.
So we have shown that a participant can prove in zero-knowledge that he properly
participates in the standard SICTA collision resolution algorithm. Any participant
who is not able to prove that his output is correct can be excluded from the group.
The corresponding round is lost and must be repeated by the remaining participants.
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Additional Verification for Optimized SICTA with a MST of 0.924
The special technique we described in the section to increase the MST from 0.693 to
0.924 uses a deterministic rule for the retransmission after a collision of two messages.
For example, only the message with the lower value must be retransmitted. So we
need additional verification to detect the participants that do not respect this rule. We
cannot verify this with a single zero-knowledge proof, but we can for instance use the
following approach.
If one of the two participants involved in the collision does not respect this rule, the
other one can switch back to random retransmission in order to split the collision. Once
the collision has been split and the two messages are out, everybody sees that there
must have been a problem in a previous round, and an investigation can be started.
The message M of the cheating participant is now known, and every participant must
then for instance send a zero-knowledge proof that he did not send this message during
the initial collision round (i.e. prove that logA1 O1/M ̸= logg y). The disruptor will notbe able to come up with an appropriate proof and can be eliminated from the group.
Further Minor Security Considerations
Malicious participants may attempt to delay the collision resolution process or to
prevent it from terminating. For instance,
• colluding participants can always choose the same round to retransmit their
messages, or
• a malicious participant can wait until all other participants have transmitted
and then chooses to retransmit his message so that a collision occurs, or
• a malicious participant may not send a valid message in the first place.
However, such malicious behaviour is easy to detect. In the previously described SICTA
algorithm with a MST of 0.924, the probability that a collision does not split is less
than or equal to 1/4 (it is exactly 1/4 for the collisions with 3 messages). Thus, the
probability that a collision does not split k times in a row is less than or equal to 1/4k.
For example, the probability that a collision does not split 5 times in a row is below
0.1%. When such malicious activity is detected, one can require commitment before
transmission and one can use zero-knowledge proofs similar to those proposed in [10]
to detect participants that are frequently involved in non-splitting collisions. If a lower
throughput is acceptable, one can go for a simpler approach and just skip the branches
of the resolution tree that do not split after several attempts, without trying to detect
the malicious participants.
5 Related Work
Superposed receiving [12, 13] is a collision resolution technique for the dining cryp-
tographers protocol that achieves the throughput of 100%. Therein, messages are
elements of an additive group. When a collision occurs, the average of the messages
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values is computed and only messages whose value is less than this average are re-
transmitted. Like in SICTA, inference cancellation is used, which leads to the 100%
throughput. However, this approach requires the use of an additive finite group and
it cannot be implemented using the algebraic ciphertexts that we need for efficient
ciphertexts generation and for zero-knowledge proofs.
The fully verifiable dining cryptographers protocol was proposed in [8] and redi-
scovered in [5]. In this protocol, we have 100% throughput. However, there is the
need for a reservation phase which can be lengthy and cumbersome. Current systems
use mixnets to perform the reservations and therefore they are inefficient when only a
few reservations are made. Further, they do not easily adapt to the situations where
participants join or leave frequently.
6 Applications
Our protocol can be used to implement computationally secure anonymous commu-
nication channels with a low latency. Another application is the realization of secret
shuffle algorithms (e.g. [11]). A secret shuffle algorithm is used to obtain a shuffled list
of values from a plurality of participants, while keeping it secret which value is coming
from which participant. Existing solutions typically require each participant to submit
a value. The protocol proposed herein also works efficiently if only a few participants
have a value to submit. In particular, it may be used to shuffle anonymous public keys
for verifiable dining cryptographers protocols in which rounds are reserved [8, 5].
7 Concluding Remarks
The main problems of the dining cryptographers protocol are collisions and malicious
participants disrupting the communication.
We have shown that with a collision resolution algorithm, it is possible to achieve
a maximum stable throughput of up to 0.924 messages per round. Further, we have
shown that if we use ciphertexts with an algebraic structure as proposed in [10], we
can verify in zero-knowledge that each participant properly retransmits his message
during the collision resolution process.
Compared to other dining cryptographer protocols, our approach does not need a
reservation phase to avoid collisions. It is therefore easier to implement and it adapts
more naturally to the situations where participants frequently join and leave the group.
We see possible applications in the fields of low-latency anonymous communication
and secret shuffling.
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